We use lasso methods to shrink, select and estimate the network linking the publicly-traded subset of the world's top 150 banks, 2003-2014. We characterize static network connectedness using full-sample estimation and dynamic network connectedness using rolling-window estimation. Statistically, we find that global banking connectedness is clearly linked to bank location, not bank assets. Dynamically, we find that global banking connectedness displays both secular and cyclical variation. The secular variation corresponds to gradual increases/decreases during episodes of gradual increases/decreases in global market integration. The cyclical variation corresponds to sharp increases during crises, involving mostly cross-country, as opposed to within-country, bank linkages.
Introduction
Network connectedness is central to modern financial risk measurement and management. It features prominently in key aspects of market risk (return connectedness and portfolio concentration), credit risk (default connectedness), counter-party and gridlock risk (bilateral and multilateral contractual connectedness), and not least, systemic risk (system-wide connectedness). It is also central to understanding underlying fundamental macroeconomic risks, in particular business cycle risk (e.g., intra-and inter-country real activity connectedness).
Recent theoretical work has therefore emphasized network connectedness and formation in financial and industry contexts, as in Jackson (2008) , Easley and Kleinberg (2010) , Acemoglu et al. (2012) , and Babus (2013) . Related empirical work, which sometimes includes banking contexts, has begun to appear; see for example, Adrian and Brunnermeier (2008) , Diebold and Yilmaz (2009) , Acharya et al. (2010) , Billio et al. (2012) , Allen et al. (2012) , Acharya et al. (2012) , Barigozzi and Brownlees (2013) , Diebold and Yilmaz (2014) , Brownlees and Engle (2015) , Giglio et al. (2015) , and Bianchi et al. (2015) .
There is, however, little empirical research on global bank connectedness. This is particularly unfortunate given the role of financial institutions in the Great Recession of 2007-2009, and given the many channels that produce linkages among banks, such as counter-party linkages associated with positions in various assets and recorded in balance sheets, and contractual linkages associated with services provided to clients and other institutions.
A key reason for the lack of empirical work on global bank connectedness is the high dimensionality of bank networks. There are simply very many important banks globally, which renders unrestricted vector-autoregressive (VAR) network approximations intractable. Hence, for example, Diebold and Yilmaz (2014) were forced to limit their analysis to U.S. institutions. Although a useful first step, such an analysis is clearly incomplete, given the global nature of the financial services industry.
In this paper we progress on both the methodological and substantive fronts. On the methodological side, we overcome the dimensionality problem while nevertheless remaining squarely in the Diebold-Yilmaz network connectedness measurement tradition, which is intimately related to the key centrality measure in the modern network literature, the mean node degree. We do so by estimating the network using lasso methods, which select and shrink in optimal ways.
On the substantive side, no longer constrained by the dimensionality problem, we perform a truly global bank connectedness analysis. In particular, we characterize the static and dynamic high-frequency stock-return volatility connectedness of all banks among the world's top 150 globally, 2004-2014. We proceed as follows. In section 2, we briefly summarize the Diebold-Yilmaz connectednessmeasurement framework. In section 3, we introduce "lassoed" large VAR's as empirical approximating models in the Diebold-Yiamaz framework. In sections 4 and 5, respectively, we provide static and dynamic characterizations of the global bank network. We conclude in section 6.
Population Network Connectedness
All network connectivity analyses require approximating models. Here we use vector autoregressions, with network connectedness measures based on variance decompositions, as proposed and developed in a series of papers that includes Yilmaz (2009), Diebold and Yilmaz (2012) , and Diebold and Yilmaz (2014) .
Such connectedness measures are appealing for several reasons. First, they make obvious intuitive sense, answering a key question, which at the most granular pairwise level is "How much of entity i's future uncertainty (at horizon H) is due to shocks arising not with entity i, but rather with entity j?"
Second, connectedness measures based on variance decompositions allow connectedness to di↵er across horizons, facilitating examination of a variety of horizons and selection of a preferred horizon if desired. This is important because, for example, 1-day connectedness may be very di↵erent from 10-or 30 day connectedness. 1 Third, Diebold and Yilmaz (2014) show that connectedness measures based on variance decompositions are closely linked to modern network theory, in particular the degree distribution and mean degree, and that they are also closely linked to recently-proposed measures of systemic risk, such as marginal expected shortfall (Acharya et al. (2010) ) and CoVaR (Adrian and Brunnermeier (2008) ).
Variance Decompositions in Approximating VAR's
As an approximating model we use an N -variable VAR(p),
Standard variance decompositions based on Cholesky factorization depend on the ordering of the variables, significantly complicating the study of directional connectedness. Hence Diebold and Yilmaz (2012) suggest exploiting the generalized VAR framework of Koop et al. (1996) and Pesaran and Shin (1998) , which produces variance decompositions invariant to ordering. Instead of attempting to orthogonalize shocks, the generalized approach allows for correlated shocks but accounts for them appropriately.
Pairwise Directional Connectedness
Firm j 's contribution to firm i 's H -step-ahead generalized forecast error variance, ✓ g ij (H), is
where ⌃ is the covariance matrix for the error vector ", jj is the standard deviation of the error term for the j th equation and e i is the selection vector with one as the i th element and zeros otherwise. Because we work in the Koop-Pesaran-Potter-Shin generalized VAR framework, the variance shares do not necessarily add to 1; that is, in general P N j=1 ✓ g ij (H)6 =1. Hence we normalize each entry of the generalized variance decomposition matrix (1) by the row sum:
. 
Total Directional Connectedness, "To" and "From"
Now we get less granular, moving from pairwise directional connectedness to total directional connectedness. Total directional connectedness to firm i from all other firms j is:
Similarly, total directional connectedness from firm i to all other firms j is
System-Wide Connectedness
Now we get still less granular, proceeding to a system-wide level. Using the normalized entries of the generalized variance decomposition matrix (2), we measure total connectedness as
We call this total connectedness system-wide connectedness. It is simply the sum of total directional connectedness whether "to" or "from." (It doesn't matter which way, because "exports" must equal "imports" at the "global" level.)
Sample Bank Network Connectedness
Thus far we have discussed population network connectedness measurement in general. Now we discuss sample connectedness measurement, specialized, moreover, to our context of global banking. We first introduce our banks and sample period, and then our preferred connectedness object (volatility), and finally, lasso methods for estimating the requisite highdimensional approximating models.
Banks and Sample Period

Volatility
For the most part we study the global bank stock return volatility network.
Background
Cyclical financial volatility connectedness is of direct interest. If volatility tracks investor fear (e.g., the VIX is often touted as an "investor fear gauge"), then volatility connectedness is fear connectedness. How connected is fear? How does it spread and cluster? Volatility connectedness is also of special interest from the perspective of real-time crisis monitoring, as volatilities tend to lurch and move together only in crises, whereas returns often move closely together in both crises and upswings. Secular volatility connectedness in financial contexts extends beyond risk considerations, at least as traditionally conceptualized, and certain types of connectedness may be directly desirable. For example, connectedness can arise from and vary with risk sharing via insurance, links between sources and uses of funds as savings are channeled into investments, patterns of comparative advantage that generate international trade, regional and global capital market integration, and enhanced coordination of global financial regulation and accounting standards.
Note that increases in secular volatility conectedness as described above are associated with something "good," whereas cyclical volatility conectedness as described above are associated with something "bad". Hence connectedness is neither intrinsically good nor intrinsically bad; instead, it depends on the situation and context. 3 In any event connectedness is important, and the ability to measure it accurately is therefore useful.
Data Requirements
It is fortunate that we do not require high-frequency balance sheet and related information, which is unavailable in real time. Instead we need only high-frequency stock return data, which are readily available. Stock market valuations are of course imperfect -like all valuations -but thousands of smart analysts devote massive time and resources to uncovering and interpreting information relevant for valuation.
Estimation
Volatility is latent and must be estimated. Many approaches to volatility estimation have received attention, including observation-driven GARCH-type models, parameter-driven stochastic volatility models, realized volatility, and implied volatility. 4 Volatilities tend to be strongly serially correlated, particularly when observed at relatively high frequency. They also tend to be distributed asymmetrically, with a right skew, and taking natural logarithms produces approximate normality.
We construct daily stock return volatilities using daily stock price data (high, low, open, close) . We assume that volatility is fixed within a day but variable across days. Then, following Garman and Klass (1980) and Alizadeh et al. (2002) , we use the log of daily high, low, opening and closing prices to estimate daily bank stock return volatility:
where H it , L it , O it and C it are, respectively, the logs of daily high, low, opening and closing prices for bank stock i on day t.
Selecting and Shrinking the Approximating Model
In applications we base connectedness assessment on an estimated approximating VAR. For compelling applications, we need the approximating VAR to be estimable in very high dimensions, somehow recovering degrees of freedom. 5 One can do so by pure shrinkage (as with traditional informative-prior Bayesian analyses, or ridge regression) or pure selection (as with traditional criteria like AIC and SIC), but blending shrinkage and selection, using variants of the lasso, proves particularly appealing.
Lasso
Consider the least-squares estimator,
For a survey see Andersen et al. (2013) . 5 In what follows we refer to estimators that achieve this as "regularized," and associated environments as involving "regularization." subject to the constraint:
Equivalently, consider the penalized estimation problem:
Concave penalty functions non-di↵erentiable at the origin produce subset selection (e.g., q ! 0) , whereas smooth convex penalties produce shrinkage (e.g., q = 2). Hence penalized estimation nests and can blend selection and shrinkage. The case of q = 1, to which we now turn, is of special interest. The lasso (short for "least absolute shrinkage and selection operator"), introduced in the seminal work of Tibshirani (1996) , solves the L 1 -penalized regression problem:
Lasso shrinks and selects. It uses the smallest q for which the minimization problem is convex, which is valuable computationally. Note that although we want to impose (or at least encourage) sparsity in our approximating model, we do not necessarily want to impose sparsity in the implied bank network. Our approach of shrinking and selecting on the approximating VAR, as opposed to shrinking and selecting on the variance decomposition network directly, achieves that goal. The approximating VAR is intentionally shrunken and made sparse by the lasso, but the variance decomposition matrix that drives our connectedness measures is a non-linear transformation of the VAR coe cients and is therefore generally not sparse. 6 Lasso has some undesirable properties, however, not least of which is that the oracle property does not obtain. Hence we now proceed to consider lasso extensions with better properties.
6 Alternative frameworks that attempt to characterize network connectedness directly from a fitted sparse VAR(1) coe cient matrix (e.g., Bonaldi et al. (2013) ) force sparse networks, by construction. Moreover, they also provide incomplete connectedness characterizations, because VAR connectedness arises not only through cross-lag linkages, but also through the disturbance covariance matrix. Network connectedness measures based on Granger-causal patterns (e.g. Billio et al. (2012) ) also ignore the disturbance covariance matrix and hence are similarly incomplete.
Extensions
The adaptive lasso estimator (Zou (2006) 
, and ⌫ > 0. Every parameter in the penalty function is weighted di↵erently, in contrast to the "regular" lasso. In particular, the weighting by inverse parameter estimates shrinks "small" coe cients most heavily. The oracle property obtains.
The elastic net estimator (Zou and Hastie (2005) ) solveŝ
Elastic net blends lasso and Ridge regression; that is, it combines a lasso L 1 penalty and a ridge L 2 penalty. There are two tuning parameters, and ↵ 2 [0, 1]. Obviously elastic net is lasso when ↵ = 1 and ridge when ↵ = 0. Unlike lasso, elastic net moves strongly-correlated predictors in or out of the model together.
The adaptive elastic net estimator (Zou and Zhang (2009) 
where w i = 1/| i | ⌫ withˆ i the OLS estimate (or ridge if regularization is needed), and ⌫ > 0. Adaptive elastic net blends adaptive lasso and elastic net and inherits good properties from each: it has the oracle property like adaptive lasso and displays improved predictor handling like elastic net.
In the empirical work to which we soon turn, we focus on estimation using the elastic net and adaptive elastic net. 
Graphical Display
The issue of how best to display results takes on great importance in high-dimensional network modeling. In our subsequent empirical work, for example, we will estimate networks with approximately 100 nodes, and presenting and examining 100 ⇥ 100 = 10, 000 estimated pairwise variance decompositions would be thoroughly uninformative. Hence we follow the huge network literature in using graphical depictions, using node and link colors, thicknesses, etc., to convey information about estimated network characteristics.
We study complete, weighted, directed networks, which we characterize using five aspects of network graphs: node size, node location, node color, edge thickness and color, and edge arrow sizes (two per edge, because the network is directed). 7
Node Size Indicates Asset Size
We make node size a linear function of bank asset size. 8 We assign the sizes of the largest and smallest nodes, and then assign the rest linearly. We emphasize assets rather than market capitalization for two reasons. First, market capitalization is subject to abrupt changes due to fluctuations in stock price. Second, cross-country di↵erences in financial system characteristics and ownership structure of publicly traded companies have direct e↵ects on market capitalization levels, thereby producing persistent di↵erences in cross-country market capitalizations.
Node Color Indicates Total Directional Connectedness "To Others"
The node color indicates total directional connectedness "to others," ranging from 3DRA02 (bright green), to E6DF22 (luminous vivid yellow), to CF9C5B (whiskey sour), to FC1C0D (bright red), to B81113 (dark red; close to scarlet). We show the color range in Figure 1 .
Node Location Indicates Average Pairwise Directional Connectedness
We determine node location using the ForceAtlas2 algorithm of Jacomy et al. (2014) as implemented in Gephi. The algorithm finds a steady state in which repelling and attracting forces exactly balance, where (1) nodes repel each other, but (2) edges attract the nodes they connect according to average pairwise directional connectedness "to" and "from." The steady state node locations depend on initial node locations and hence are not unique. This is largely irrelevant, however, as we are interested in relative, not absolute, node locations in equilibrium.
Edge Thickness Also Indicates Average Pairwise Directional Connectedness
Note that edge color indicates nothing; it never changes.
Edge Arrow Sizes Indicate Pairwise Directional Connectedness "To" and "From" Note that because the full set of edge arrow sizes reveals the full set of pairwise directional connectednesses, from which all else can be derived (with the exception of asset size), the various additional devices employed as described (node color, node location, and edge thickness) are in principle redundant and therefore unnecessary. In practice, however, they are helpful for examining large networks in which, for example, the thousands of arrows can be largely impossible to see. They are therefore invaluable supplements to examination of "edge arrows" alone.
Trimming Improves Interpretabilty
We trim the less important half of estimated links. This dramatically improves interpretability of the network graphs while simultaneously discarding almost no information, as the trimmed links are responsible for only a negligible fraction of system-wide connectedness.
Static Estimation of the Global Bank Network
We estimate logarithmic volatility VAR's using the adaptive elastic net as described above. Then we compute variance decompositions and corresponding connectedness measures, using the estimated VAR parameters.
The Individual Bank Network
We show the full-sample global bank network graph in Figure 2 . A striking result is immediately apparent: the graph shows clear bank clustering, both within and across countries.
The within-country bank clustering is ubiquitous, ranging from countries with many banks in our sample (e.g., U.S., Canada, Australia, China, Japan) to those with only two or three (e.g., Korea, Singapore, India, Malaysia). The cross-country clustering is also obvious throughout the graph, whose left side clearly tends to contain banks if eastern countries, and whose right side clearly tends to contain banks of western countries. Moreover, the western side clearly breaks into a large Anglo / European bank cluster and a smaller American / Canadian cluster, each of which contains sub-clusters.
It is not obvious that country of origin would be the dominant factor driving network connectedness. One might have thought, for example, that other factors, such as bank size, might dominate, but such is not the case. Japan illustrates this clearly. Although the majority of very large banks are located in the Anglo / American / European cluster, the three very large Japanese banks (Mitsubishi UFJ, Mizuho Financial, and Sumitomo Mitsui Financial) are located not in the Anglo / American / European cluster, but rather in the Japanese cluster.
Including Sovereign Bonds
Above we analyzed the global network of bank equity return volatilities, but we can also include other important financial asset volatilities. This is potentially interesting because, although the U.S. financial crisis did not have a sovereign debt component, the ensuing European crisis did.
Against this background, we now include sovereign bond yield volatilities in the analysis, in addition to bank stock volatilities. We include 10-year G-7 sovereigns (United States, Germany, France, Japan, United Kingdom, Canada, and Italy), as well as those of Spain, Greece and Australia. We plot the estimated individual bank / sovereign bond network in Figure 3 . The sovereigns appear in the upper left of the graph, which is otherwise similar to Figure 2. 9 Figure 3 delivers several related insights. First, the bonds cluster strongly. Second, European bond nodes are nevertheless closer to European bank nodes, U.S. and Canadian bond nodes are closer to U.S. and Canadian bank nodes, and Japanese and Australian bond nodes are closer to Japanese and Australian bank nodes. Third, although the bond nodes are pulled toward their respective country bank nodes, they remain completely distinct and never appear inside their national/regional banking clusters: bank stocks form regional/national clusters, and sovereign bonds are not part of those clusters. 
The Country Bank Network
In Figure 4 we aggregate the individual bank network graph to obtain the country bank network graph. 10 This serves two useful and distinct purposes.
First, examination of the country bank network is intrinsically interesting and a logical next step. Our individual-bank analysis showed strong connectedness of banks both within and across countries, so we now proceed to dig more deeply into the cross-country links. Examination of the country bank network allows us to distinguish the relative strengths of directional "to" and "from" connectedness of the most-connected country banking systems.
Second, the smaller number of edges in the country bank network makes visual interpretation of connectedness simpler and more revealing. (29 countries produce only 29 2 = 841 edges in the country network, whereas 96 banks produce 96 2 = 9216 edges in the bank network.)
The U.S. is clearly massively connected; its strongest links are with Canada, Great Britain, and Australia. It is not always visible, but the arrows indicate greater connectedness from the U.S. to Canada, Australia and Great Britain than conversely.
The Anglo / European countries form a cluster just above the U.S. Of the Anglo / European countries, Britain has the strongest links to and from the U.S. The northern European countries are to the south-east of the cluster; Sweden has the strongest connectedness with the U.S. Ireland, Portugal, Greece, Finland and Austria are located on the perimeter of the cluster.
Other countries are scattered farther away from the European cluster. As noted previously for individual banks, moving leftward on the graph generally takes one from western to eastern countries.
We can also include sovereign bonds. In Figure 5 we show the estimated country bank / sovereign bond network.
Dynamic Estimation of the Global Bank Network
We now characterize the global banking network dynamically. We use rolling estimation with a 150-day window, with repeated cross validation of the penalty parameter in each window. 11 We start with comparisons of estimated network graphs "before and after" major crisis episodes, and then we proceed to examine the continuous real-time evolution of systemwide connectedness.
Banks Pre-and Post-Lehman
The critical point in the financial crisis was Lehman's bankruptcy, which was announced on September 15, 2008. In Figure 6 we show the 96-bank network graphs on September 1, 2008 and on November 21, 2008. There is a clear di↵erence between the individual bank network graphs on the two dates.
In particular, connectedness of U.S. banks with others increased sharply after Lehman's collapse and the transformation of the U.S. financial crisis into a global one. Before the Lehman collapse, the U.S. and European banks stood far apart around the Anglo / American / European cluster, with was visible gap in the network graph between the U.S. and European banks. The Japanese and Chinese banks also stood apart. Once the Lehman shock hit global markets, the entire individual bank network, perhaps with the exception of Chinese banks, moved closer together, indicating the spread of volatility across bank stocks and countries.
A similar picture arises when we analyze the country bank network before and after Lehman's collapse. We show the country bank network graphs in Figure 7 . Connectedness was comparatively weak before the collapse, and much stronger afterward. Moreover, the directional volatility connectedness from the U.S. to others increased substantially.
Banks, Bonds, and the European Debt Crisis
To see how the individual bank / sovereign bond network was transformed following the European banking and sovereign bond crisis, we analyze the network graph once the European sovereign debt and banking crisis spread throughout the continent, a↵ecting mostly the periphery countries such as Greece, Portugal, Ireland, Italy and Spain. However, sovereign bonds of the center countries such as Germany, France and the Great Britain could not be isolated from the events unfolding in the periphery. As a result, by the end of the summer 2011 connectedness reached one of its high points on October 7, 2011.
In Figure 8(a) we show the individual bank / sovereign bond network on October 7, 2011, when the volatility connectedness of the banks and bonds reached its local maximum. In Figure 8 (b), we once again show the full-sample graph, for comparison. The graphs are quite di↵erent.
On Oct. 7, 2011, bond yield volatilities are no longer on the outskirts of the regional / national banking clusters. Indeed, bond yield volatilities for the U.S., the UK, Germany and France moved toward the center of the European / North American banking cluster. Italy and Spain did not move to the center of the cluster, but they are still closer to the center of Anglo / American / European cluster than they were in the full sample. Greek bonds, on the other hand, are separated from other European bonds. Australian bonds moved closer to the Japanese bonds. Furthermore, the nodes for the Japanese and Chinese banks, as well as the ones from other countries, moved closer to the Anglo / American / European cluster, indicating stronger volatility connectedness in October 2011 compared to the full sample. All told, Figure 8 clearly shows how the European banking and sovereign debt crises had become intertwined as of October 2011. The U.S. banks are farther away from the center of the Anglo / American / European cluster, and the European banks are at the center, close to the government bond markets of the U.S., France Germany, and the U.K.
System-Wide Connectedness
Now we consider system-wide connectedness. There are two interesting ways to display and decompose it.
Trend and Cycle
The first involves distinguishing between secular (trend) and cyclical variation, as shown in Figure 10 . As indicated by the superimposed piece-wise linear trend, total system-wide connectedness broadly increased for roughly the first half of our sample, peaking with the Lehman bankruptcy. It then decreased gradually, albeit with some major bumps associated with the European debt crisis, falling by almost twenty percentage points relative to its peak by the end of the sample. The pre-Lehman upward connectedness trend is "good," corresponding to increased financial market integration, and the post-Lehman connectedness trend is evidently similarly "bad," presumably corresponding to decreased financial market integration. Bursts of cyclical connectedness around trend, in contrast, are always "bad," corresponding to crises.
Let us first discuss aspects of the pre-Lehman episode. First, the connectedness of major global bank stocks increased following the Fed's unexpected decision to tighten monetary policy in May and June 2006. However, there was no other major volatility shock across the global banking system in 2006, so that estimated connectedness subsides as the observations for May-June 2006 vanish from the rolling-window. Volatility connectedness was low in Figure 9 : System-Wide Connectedness, With Superimposed Trend early 2007. However, following the collapse of several mortgage originators in the U.S., connectedness increased sharply. This jump was followed by an even greater jump during the liquidity crisis of August 2007, when it became apparent that along with the U.S. banks the European banks also had to write o↵ billions of dollars of losses due to their investments in mortgage backed securities. By the end of 2007, it became apparent that the major U.S. banks would end up writing of tens of billions of dollars in losses. Then in March 2008, Bear Stearns, one of the top U.S. investment banks, was acquired by J.P. Morgan to avoid bankruptcy. Now consider the post-Lehman episode. Total system-wide connectedness reached its peak following the Lehman bankruptcy on September 15, 2008, at which time the U.S. government introduced a huge package of direct capital injection in major U.S. banks. As months passed, the U.S. markets calmed, and total system-wide connectedness started to trend downward. However, in 2009 and 2010 the EU member countries were shocked by developments in the banking and sovereign debt markets of some of its peripheral member Then in 2011, Italy and Spain joined the countries with stressed banking systems and sovereign bond markets. As a result, total system-wide connectedness experienced two more significant jumps in May 2010 (due to delay in the rescue package for Greece) and in July-August 2011 (due to spread of sovereign debt and banking sector worries to Spain and Italy).
Cross-Country and Within-Country
The second way to display and decompose dynamic system-wide connectedness involves decomposing it into two parts: cross-country and within-country, as in Figure 10 . Crosscountry system-wide connectedness is the sum of all pairwise connectedness across banks located in di↵erent countries. Within-country system-wide connectedness is the sum of pairwise connectedness across banks in the same country. By construction cross-country and within-country system-wide connectedness must sum to total system-wide connectedness.
The decomposition is of interest because exploring the country origins of volatility shocks and their temporal evolution may help us better understand the dynamics of the global bank connectedness. Although we are interested in global banking network and global banking connectedness, there are many banks in our sample located in the same country. Moreover, the banks with the same country of origin tend to be more connected to each other as they are exposed to the same country-level shocks.
The decomposition shows that most movements in total system-wide connectedness are due to movements in cross-country system-wide connectedness. Cross-country system-wide connectedness is around 40% from 2004 to May 2006, but it then begins to fluctuate significantly. Following the Fed's unexpected decision to further tighten U.S. monetary policy, cross-country system-wide connectedness increases by around 15% in May-December 2006. Following this episode, cross-country connectedness continues to vary throughout the sample.
Size and Eigenvalue Centrality
One of the primary goal of the network analysis is to evaluate the relative importance of each individual member in the network. This is also relevant for the global banking network, because, as shown during the recent global financial crisis, an individual bank may be the source of financial stress that can be transmitted to the whole system. Furthermore, from the policymakers point of view, detecting the systemically important financial institutions carries enormous importance in preventing future crises. In order to shed some light on this issue, we calculate the eigenvalue centrality of each bank in our sample using our estimated network measures with the following formula.
where S t is Nx1 vector of centrality of the banks and C t is NxN connectedness (adjacency) matrix of the network at time t. So the eigenvalue centrality for a bank is equal to the sum of the centralities of the connected banks weighted by the size of the respective edge. The solution for S t in the above equation corresponds to eigenvector associated with the largest eigenvalue of connectedness matrix C t . As we've already obtained the dynamic volatility connectedness measures, we can also calculate the dynamic centrality measures evolving over time. The dynamic analysis therefore allows us to investigate the interaction between bank market capitalization and centrality measures over time.
Toward that objective, we estimate the cross-section rank regression between bank eigenvalue centrality and bank market capitalization for each sub-sample window. Figure 11 presents the rank regression coe cient, its p-value and the R 2 of the rank regression over the rolling windows. In line with the expectation, the bank eigenvalue centrality is highly correlated with the bank size, with the correlation coe cient fluctuating between 0.4 and 0.6 in 2004 and 2005. More importantly, however, the correlation between the centrality rank and the size rank weakened during the global financial crisis of late 2008 and early 2009. It even disappeared completely during the second phase of the European debt crisis in the summer of 2011 and in the second half of 2012. Over these episodes the p-value of the correlation coe cient moved well above the 5% level.
On the basis of this evidence we can conclude that, whereas the largest banks are more likely to be central in the global financial system in good times, smaller banks can also become central during bad times and generate volatility connectedness that will have systemic implications. 
Conclusion
We have used lasso methods to shrink, select and estimate the network linking the publiclytraded subset of the world's top 150 banks, 2003-2014. We characterize static network connectedness using full-sample estimation and dynamic network connectedness using rollingwindow estimation. Statically, we find that global banking connectedness is clearly linked to bank location, not bank assets. Dynamically, we find that global banking connectedness displays both secular and cyclical variation. The secular variation corresponds to gradual increases/decreases during episodes of gradual increases/decreases in global market integration. The cyclical variation corresponds to sharp increases during crises, involving mostly cross-country, as opposed to within-country, bank linkages.
Appendices A Global Bank Detail, by Assets
Here we provide detail on our sample of all 96 publicly-traded banks in the world's top 150 (by assets). In Table 1 we show the banks ordered by assets, and we provide market capitalizations and assets (both in billions of U.S. dollars), our bank codes (which shows country), and Reuters tickers. The bank codes are easier to understand than the Reuters ticker, particularly as regards identifying banks' countries, so we use them in our empirical work. 
